Values and Identities in Ireland’s Peace Policy: Four Centuries of Norm Continuity and Change

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Abstract: This article seeks to solve the puzzle of what explains Irish peace policy norm consistency for over three centuries and the recent reversal of these norms. The methodology analyses values and identities in Irish leaders’ foreign policy discourses and practices, producing evidence that Irish peace policy norms are consistently: independence and neutrality for Ireland in the cause of peace and security; self-determination; anti-imperialism; third world solidarity; and resistance to famine and slavery. In the early 1900s, after Ireland gained statehood, the addition of: institutional cooperation; a constitutional commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes; armed neutrality; UN peacekeeping; and an explicit subordination of material interests for moral, justice-based norms, made this small postcolonial state an historically-driven Natural Born Peacemaker. Elite-led norm reversals consolidated in the 2000s suggests a vital explanatory relationship with elite corruption and associated specific personality characteristics, and the need to revise elite socialisation theory to incorporate these variables.

KEYWORDS: Foreign Policy Norms, Ireland, Peace Policy, Neutrality, Elite Corruption

Introduction

The content of the elements and ethos of Ireland’s peace policy established within early discourses of Irish foreign policy is largely explained by her history. Ireland’s pre-independence peace policy, historical narratives and security identities are found in pivotal Irish leaders’ discourses and practices, namely Theobald Wolfe Tone in the 1700s; Daniel O’Connell in the 1800s; Pádraic Pearse, James Connolly, and Seán Lester in the early 1900s, respectively, and suggest that peoples subjected to slavery, oppression, starvation, colonisation and war for centuries can be those most determined to realise a genuinely peace-promotive foreign policy.

Ireland’s post-independence official ethos of Irish peace policy is found in the discourses of Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank Aiken and Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Éamon de Valera until the mid-1900s. During this era, Irish peace policy was driven as much by ideas and norms as by survival and material interests; indeed, the 1916 Proclamation of Independence rendered peace norms and survival as constitutive (Ireland, 1916). Ireland’s early
UN policy explicitly subordinated material interests to moral and justice-based ideas to achieve peace. There is a remarkable consistency of the ethos and elements of peace policy in the discourses and practices of the above leaders across several centuries.

During two key periods, the 1960s and the 2000s, this consistency is broken and policy is reversed in the context of Ireland’s pursuit of membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the new ‘legal’ European Union (EU), respectively. Against the background of deeper European integration through successive Treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon) and reconfigured relations with the United Nations, the reversals of traditional elements of Irish peace policy are magnified by public opinion and NGOs’ resistance to these changes. The question remains: what explains these reversals?

The pre-independence leaders foretell in pinpointing corruption as a barrier to the achievement of Ireland’s independence, the necessary pre-condition to conduct a peace policy designed to achieve peace in Ireland and abroad. They suggest this paper’s working hypothesis: corruption is associated with elites’ individual failure at the state level to adhere to ‘normative’ Irish foreign policy and should prove to be a significant predictor of the late 20th century reversals in crucial elements of Ireland’s historic peace policy.

Background to the Corruption Hypothesis: The Pre-Independence Leaders’ Arguments

Theobald Wolfe Tone, Daniel O’Connell and Pádraic Pearse each argued that corruption has severe negative consequences for the achievement of Irish peace policy and its corollary pre-condition of Irish independence. In 1790 Wolfe Tone stated clearly in his manifest for Irish neutrality:

> Your innocence is yet, I trust, untainted by the rank leaven of corruption. Ye have no interests to bias your judgment but the interest of Ireland…direct your councils to …the establishment of the welfare, and glory and independence of Ireland for ever and ever. (Tone 30 June 1790 in Moody et al. 2009 [Vol. 1]: 61, emphasis added)

Tone linked neutrality as a peace policy to a lack of corruption and the single-minded pursuit of Ireland’s interests, including the survival and welfare of the Irish people.

In 1811, Daniel O’Connell conferred thanks on statesmen who “had, with the purest patriotism, refused everything that power could give; they had rejected all the allurements of office, rather than sacrifice, or even postpone the assertion of principle” (1871: 53) in contrast to

> Sir William [Lawrence] Parsons… [who] once enacted patriotism in Ireland – I may be mistaken but I do not think he ever supported our claims…..our tone is disliked – yes my lord, they dislike the tone which men should use who are deeply anxious for the good of their country, and who have no other object. … We see our own resources lavishly squandered upon absurd projects whilst our tottering paper currency is verging fast to bankruptcy (1871: 62) … yes, my lord, we are told if we had been [servile and base in our language, and] dastardly in our conduct, we should be nearer success….that had we shown ourselves prone to servility and submission, and silent in oppression, we should advance our emancipation. (1871: 63, emphasis added)

O’Connell’s discourses consistently show resistance to corruptive traits associated with elite socialization-induced sociopaths, psychopaths, and the misuse of state resources and networks for elite benefit rather than for the good of Ireland and her people.

Pádraic Pearse, commandant of the 1916 Rising, also espoused a patriotism linked to peace for Ireland and pledged his life to the goal. Like Tone and O’Connell before him, he
also refers to corruption as a barrier to achieving Irish independence and peace policy. In 1915, at the graveside of O’Donovan Rossa, he declared:

We pledge to Ireland our life, and we pledge to English rule our hate. This is a place of peace...
I hold it a Christian thing, as O’Donovan Rossa did, to hate evil, to hate untruth, to hate oppression, and hating them, to strive to overthrow them….from the graves of patriot men and women spring living nations. The defenders of this realm had worked well in secret and in the open. They think they have pacified Ireland. They think they have purchased half of us and intimidated the other half. …Ireland unfree shall never be at peace. (de Vere White 1948: 17, emphasis added)

Notably all three men were willing to sacrifice themselves in order to secure the freedom of the next generation (as were Connolly, de Valera, and Aiken who fought in the 1916 Rising), as O’Connell explained,

to myself personally….if I can procure freedom for my country, then I am content with torture – death – with what is worse than either, with slavery!… For myself I can submit to slavery, but not for them [my children]. (1871: 353)

These leaders from the late 1700s to the early 1900s espoused similar norms of Irish peace policy, and together they have provided the evidence for this paper’s hypothesis, that corruption can explain the changes to their peace policy norms made by succeeding generations of Irish leaders.

Criminology-Inspired Deviations from Elite Socialisation Theory: Corruption as a Predictor

Jeffrey T. Checkel’s concept of a norm and his theory of elite socialisation converge: he defines a norm as “collective understandings that make behavioral claims on actors” (1998: 326-327, emphasis added); these behaviours are shaped by elite socialisation in producing norm change that affects the formulation of state foreign policy. Other mechanisms of norm change include shaming and persuasion (see Beyer and Hofmann 2011: 290). The motivational factors and change mechanisms of elite corruption and institutional patronage are absent from the framework of understanding. Type I actors are defined as those who follow the rules of the community or group, playing the role that is socially expected, with no consideration of whether it’s the right thing to do or not (Checkel 2005: 811-812) and Type II actors are defined as those who act according to a logic of appropriateness – because they believe it is the right thing to do. The norms of democracy suggest that elites would be expected to act in the interests of the mass public or the national interest, behaviour that is both socially expected and appropriate. The question that is seemingly glossed over is: what is “the right thing to do” and for whom?

Does elite socialisation theory naively omit the variable of corruption – defined in the vernacular as “dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power” – whereby actors follow a strategy of mutual enrichment, for example, the political elite solicit payments from businessmen ostensibly for party purposes, and in return, shape legislation and policy in the interests of their business paymasters? There is widespread corruption in many states (e.g. networks of corruption established by political elites across governmental, civil and military services involving individual payoffs and/or the opportunity to place family and friends in top positions in governmental or corporate structures (Vogl 2012: 85)) and in international organisations (e.g. 2,253 companies from sixty-six countries paid bribes total-
ling US$ 1.8bn in exchange for contracts under the UN oil-for-food program (Vogl 2012: 93)). Corruption has negative effects on peace and security (Vogl 2012: 31) and democracy and justice (Vogl 2012: 143). Yet, to date, the literature has failed to fully consider the variable of corruption in explanations of why state decision-makers comply at the European Union level knowing that their decisions are against the wishes of the majority of people they purport to represent.

Psychopaths and Sociopaths: intersections with corruption, patronage and politics

The term psychopathy originated within the “hard sciences” and although it is not a clinical diagnosis in the DSM-IV (the most recent edition of the diagnostic manual for mental disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association), it can be usefully considered as a personality trait (O’Boyle et al. 2012: 558). Psychopathy describes an individual marked by a particular set or combination of affective and behavioural characteristics, including: (1) lack of conscience; (2) limited emotional range; (3) inability to experience empathy for others; (4) willingness and remarkable ability to lie convincingly; (5) superficial, deceptive charm; (6) aggressive pursuit of selfish goals; (7) various forms of reckless power and thrill-seeking; (8) highly Machiavellian behaviour (psychopathy, along with Machiavellianism and narcissism make up what is known as the “dark triad” of character traits (O’Boyle et al. 2012), with psychopathy known as the mean side of the triad (Babiak and Hare 2006: 125)) and finally, (9) lack of guilt or remorse for consequences to others of their destructive behaviour. Robert Hare also includes in his definition “the persistent violation of social norms and expectations.” (2003:188)

Psychopaths are recognised as displaying a level of callousness not necessarily seen in all of those with Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) or in all sociopaths. Paul Babiak and Robert Hare describe sociopathy as referring to “patterns of attitudes and behaviors that are considered antisocial and criminal by society at large, but are seen as normal or necessary by the subculture or social environment in which they developed.” (2006: 19, emphasis added) In other words, a sociopath might inherently be an ethical person, born with a normal genetic and biological capacity for empathy and conscience, who internalizes potentially destructive propensities for behaviour through their development and participation in some pocket within society, or in the case of politicians, within domestic or European institutional processes of elite socialisation.

The mainstream approach to explaining norm compliance encompasses rational instrumental choices and social learning (Checkel 2001: 554). This prompts two questions, the first, general, and the second, case-specific: (1) is corruption accepted – or at least acknowledged – as a ‘norm’ amongst state elites in their political sub-culture? (2) Does sociopathic behaviour associated with corruption (e.g. accepting direct payments, indirect appropriation appointments, or patronage positions, e.g. EU Ambassador or Commissioner roles with generous salaries, benefits and pensions), better explain decisions of elites from neutral states to overturn centuries of foreign policy peace norms in complying with the European Union defence policy treaty provisions (Devine 2011: 352, 358), rather than belonging, learning or persuasion?

Psychopathy can explain corruption on a large scale at the elite level within nations; sociopathy can explain similar, unethical practices at the elite level within international organisations like the UN or regional organisations such as the European Union. The following table outlines the likely associations between these variants of deviations from Elite Socialisation Theory:
The Implications for the Core Theme of This Special Issue is that small nations like Ireland, with a history of brutal and violent colonisation, can produce political leaders capable of being natural born peacemakers, through their determined adherence to ideals, values and ethics in political behaviour, born from an unshakeable desire for freedom from oppression. On the other hand, as Daniel O’Connell pointed out in the 1800s, “nations have been driven mad by oppression” (O’Ferrall 1981: 53) and colonisation’s brutality, injustice and violence provides mass-level adverse or extreme levels of environmental trauma that can trigger a vulnerability to antisocial spectrum behaviours in those with a genetic predisposition (low activity MAOA genotype). (Caspi et al. 2002: 853) The developmental literature on trauma and abuse and the aforementioned genetic research on psychopathy both indicate that patterns of behaviour are transferred, biologically and socially, at the individual level through successive generations (Milburn and Conrad 1996: 60, 186; Heller and LaPierre 2012: 62; Miller 2008: 103). In summary, surviving abuse is no guarantee of political consciousness; trauma can lower one’s ability to question other injustices unless fate, resources and radicalizing influences intervene in an individual’s life (Thompson 1996: 106). Scaling back up from the individual to the mass level, this suggests the heightened likelihood of an intergenerational pattern of psychopathy in societies with a history of oppression. Ireland presents as a case in point. Finally, preliminary research indicates that psychopaths populate the highest echelons of business and politics more than other professions. Thus, if leaders with psychopath or sociopath traits predominate in political office and policy-making, engagement in unethical activities are to be expected. In the Irish case, leaders’ failure to uphold principled policy stances favouring constituents’ common good should be associated with evidence of these same individuals’ engagement in patronage or corruption.

The two leaders who instigated the most significant reversals in Irish peace policy norms, Seán Lemass and Bertie Ahern, share a distinctly similar set of personal and behavioural characteristics at the individual level as well as non-normative discourses and practices at the state level. Other leaders such as Garret FitzGerald and Charles Haughey are also briefly examined: their discourses and practices on neutrality as a constitutive norm of Irish peace policy oscillated so wildly over time as to indicate a significant lack of integrity, such that one would also expect a relationship with the corruption variable. If the working hypothesis holds in the light of supporting evidence, this would indicate the need to revise aspects of elite socialisation theory to include the variable of corruption together with leaders exhibiting psychopathic or sociopathic traits, in explanations of changes in national policy within a framework of supranational integration.

Data

The primary data chronologically start with private letters, pamphlets and other collected speeches and writings by Theobald Wolfe Tone (recently published in three volumes edited by Moody et al., 2009); two volumes of writings and speeches of Daniel O’Connell and others.
Creating the Nationalist Tradition of Irish ‘Peace’ Norms: Theobald Wolfe Tone in the 1700s

Theobald Wolfe Tone was an Irish Protestant nationalist leader active in the 1700s who first articulated an internal Irish peace policy based on a cultural nationalism and political independence that was absolute in allowing Irish people to rule themselves and take decisions in their own interests instead of permitting a continuation of some form of colonial rule under Britain. (Moody et al. 2009: xxii, xxi) Tone articulated an external Irish peace policy separate from Britain’s foreign policy, based on Irish independence in foreign affairs and neutrality. (Tone in Moody et al. 2009: 54, 52) Neutrality is the core constitutive norm of Irish peace policy, serving as the ‘means’ to the ‘end’ of peace for successive Irish nationalist leaders. Tone believed in an Irish national identity that upheld the right to self-determination of the Irish people and sought to overturn her subaltern position as a satellite revolving around great powers, in particular, the necessary consequence of being dragged into British wars to serve British interests and suffering concomitant starvation and famine (Tone in Moody et al. 2009: 58).

Tone channelled his political activities into creating a Hiberno-French alliance that might reduce the power of Britain and secure Irish independence. He was motivated by the miseries suffered by the people of Ireland, stating, “I, for one, in the last war with difficulty preserved myself and my family from the jaws of famine.” (Tone, July 1790 in Moody et al. 2009 [Vol. 1]: 65) He lobbied for and helped to mobilise several French expeditions to Ireland. Upon landing in Ireland with a new armée d’Irland at Lough Swilly on 3 November 1798, Tone was arrested, charged, found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. He cut his own throat whilst in custody because he was denied a soldier’s death, unaware that the charges had been acquitted upon appeal. “With a strong sense of honour and dignity he was bound to prefer suicide to an ignominious death” (Moody et al. 2009 [Vol. 3]: xxv); Theobald Wolfe Tone died on 19th November 1798. The consistency and nature of the content of Tone’s peace policy norms and his willingness to sacrifice his life for his values are positively associated with an evident lack of corruption.

Consolidating the Tradition of Irish ‘Peace’ Norms: Daniel O’Connell in the 1800s

Identity

Known as “the ‘Liberator’” (Lyons 1971: 93) and arguably the first modern politician in Western Europe, Daniel O’Connell’s two aims were to repeal the Act of Union between Britain and Ireland and to secure religious emancipation for Catholics through a non-violent campaign of mass agitation. O’Connell achieved the latter goal in 1829 but not his preferred former goal. O’Connell infused solidarity with the oppressed as a defining element
of an Irish identity based on universal toleration and non-aggression – “give back Ireland to her hardy and brave population; and you have nothing to dread from foreign power” (O'Connell 1871: 23); this characteristic of non-belligerence is also a key factor in current support for Irish neutrality amongst Irish public opinion (Devine 2008a: 471) - and a specific rejection of hatred for British people, despite suffering a number of wrongs and the horror of famine at the behest of British policy. (O'Connell 1871: 78, 455)

Policy

Like Tone before him, Daniel O'Connell also argued that the security and peace of Ireland could only be achieved through independence (O'Connell 1871: 17), and that external peace, including the peace of Britain and the liberties of the civilized world (O'Connell 1871: 214), also depended on self-rule. O'Connell saw Ireland’s problems clearly: at a state structural level, being kept as a cheap food supplier and dependent on agricultural production to suit the interests of the British Empire, and at an individual level, the extreme poverty and lack of education of the Irish people (O’Ferrall 1981: 82). He sought to eradicate the violence in Irish society (O’Ferrall 1981: 92), the unrelenting distress of Ireland and her immense poverty (O’Ferrall 1981: 95). O'Connell supported the use of force to resist and defend against unjust aggression, seen in his July 1846 Peace Resolutions (O’Ferrall 1981: 129). He believed the threat of violence in the form of civil war was imminent unless action was taken and pledged his life to achieve peace, independence and security of Ireland. This did not contradict his belief “that the greatest and most desirable of political changes may be achieved by moral means alone, and that no human revolution is worth the effusion of one single drop of blood.” (Gwynn 1947: 239) He thought that Ireland’s prospects would improve through a reformed parliament and through the extension of suffrage (O’Ferrall 1981: 128).

Values: anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, anti-racism, independence, and equality in interdependence

O'Connell was opportunistic, realistic and flexible (O’Ferrall 1981: 82) and because of this at times his bargaining positions did not reflect his political ideals. Although he briefly flirted with the federal idea (Moley 1974: 163, 224) and never advocated separation from the Crown (Moley 1974: 162), he was not an Imperialist because: (1) the only part of the constitution he was attached to was the voice of the people (O’Ferrall 1981: 54); (2) he hated racism and militarism, two main components at the heart of imperialism (O’Ferrall 1981: 139); (3) he did not share the assumption of superiority held by British imperialists (O’Ferrall 1981: 120) and finally and most importantly, (4) it was out of political expediency that he argued to a specific audience of the British government and public opinion that their support of Irish claims would enhance the British Empire (O’Ferrall 1981: 52). He could see that Ireland and Britain would continue to be interdependent and sought a prosperous, equitable free trade relationship with Britain. (Moley 1974: 223) Once the promised trade and prosperity linked to Ireland’s acceptance of the Act of Union was not realised, he declared “as long as the Union continues, so long must our misfortunes accumulate.” (O’Connell 1871: 18) He reified Irish independence to serve the common good as a goal above all others, including Catholic emancipation (O’Connell 1871: 215); “I abandon all wish for emancipation, if it delays that repeal” (O’Connell 1871: 25).
O'Connell relied on his legal practice income to sustain his unsalaried position as a member of the House of Commons. He accrued significant debt hosting dignitaries and political elites in Kerry and Dublin whom he needed to influence to achieve emancipation and repeal of the Union. (Moley 1974: 113; Gwynn 1947: 242) Known as a ‘soft touch’ because he was generous to a fault and loaned money to friends, his widening circle of acquaintances became a widening circle of borrowers (Moley 1974: 114). O'Connell sold assets to help pay off his debts. He adhered to moral principles over financial support, for example, as an abolitionist and advocate of full civil rights for blacks in America, he alienated his Irish American support – “a man whose literal belief in the brotherhood of man forbade him to take a compliant stand on American slavery for the sake of financial support for his domestic political goals from the overseas Irish.” (O’Ferrall 1981: 109) O'Connell made personal sacrifices for his central ideals (O’Ferrall 1981: 16), a trademark of those who articulated the same peace norms before him (Tone), and who followed in his footsteps (Pearse, Connolly, Aiken and de Valera). His case provides evidence in support of the working hypothesis of the links between core moral values, personal sacrifice, and lack of corruption, with support for Irish peace norms.

The Imperialist Tradition of Irish ‘Peace’ Norms: John Redmond

John Redmond, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, was one of the “Home Rulers… [who] professed a decided loyalty to the Empire” (Wells 1919: 31-32); his views on issues affecting Ireland were rather those of an English Liberal than of an Irish revolutionary. (Wells 1919: 41) When Asquith tabled the third Home Rule Bill in the House of Commons on April 11, 1912, Redmond responded: “we want peace for our country, and I say that Ireland is willing to accept a Statutory Parliament created by statute of this Imperial Parliament as a final settlement.” (Wells 1919: 97) He “firmly resisted all attempts to move in the separatist direction”, with the Irish Parliamentary Party’s endorsement of Irish involvement in the Great War final proof of this. (Wells 1919: 16) According to Wells, “there were no possible means of accommodation between himself and those Irishmen who … asserted Irish neutrality in the war” (1919: 22-23) because Redmond believed Ireland would never be “a Sovereign State, wholly ‘on its own’ in the world.” (Wells 1919: 46) In 1915, he regarded Sinn Féin as “an insignificant handful of pro-Germans” (Wells 1919: 22) in contrast to Kevin O'Higgins’ distinction that “Sinn Féiners were out simply for the independence of Ireland and not necessarily for the destruction of the British Empire.” (De Vere White 1948: 23) In the absence of “a Parliament in the country responsible to the people”, Kevin O'Higgins noted that Redmond and his party were “divorced from the people” (McCarrthy 2006: 81) which might explain why Redmond was personally convinced that once Irish people possessed a wide measure of self-government, they would be happy in their place within the Empire. (Wells 1919: 16) Redmond’s discourses on Irish peace policy, as he conceived of it, were consistent with the theory of Liberal Imperialism. (Wells 1919: 46-47) He accepted a reduced Irish membership at Westminster on the basis that “you must have a certain amount of abnormality in your proceedings here” (Wells 1919: 98) and linked his Imperialist Tradition - urging [inter] dependence on England - to a desire for peace. The Sinn Féin revolt was largely due to his leading the Irish Parliamentary Party upon an excessively conciliatory plan. (Wells 1919: 40)
Ireland’s Anti-Imperialists were determined to persuade other countries in the world “that this country is not, and will not be, automatically involved in war, merely because Britain is involved in war, that this diplomatic and military unity of the British Empire does not exist, and that we will prevent it existing” and sought the creation of an Irish Department of External Affairs to achieve this goal (Œ Vol. 14: Cols. 574-575). O’Higgins emphasised the identity of his own country as a separate state that could not be represented by Great Britain. (de Vere White 1948: 236) After Redmond’s death, the Irish Parliamentary Party was led by John Dillon, described by O’Higgins as “the corrupt and emasculated parliamentary party in Ireland.” (de Vere White 1948: 31)

The exercise of traditional Irish ‘peace’ norms: James Connolly and Pádraic Pearse

Holding opposing political views to Redmond and his cohort, James Connolly and Pádraic Pearse were two prominent national leaders of the early 1900s who led the Easter Rising of 1916. The two leaders drew on Tone’s and O’Connell’s politics and philosophy in founding the Irish Neutrality League to campaign against the recruitment of Irish people to serve the interests of the British Empire in British Wars (Pearse 1924: 322; Connolly 1916a). Connolly and Pearse also fought, as Tone and O’Connell did, against the continued slavery of the Irish people by basing their willingness to die to achieve Irish independence in a framework of universal rights and equality (Connolly 1915). As Connolly put it, they were ready to die to win for Ireland the rights that the British Government was asking them to die to win for Belgium in the First World War. Pearse and Connolly wanted to achieve independence through an uprising as peacefully as possible, and were specific about the limits to the exercise of violence in what they knew was to be a doomed uprising (Connolly 1916b; Pearse 1924: 322-323).

Their execution by the British authorities after the rebellion was crushed, sedimented rather than expunged, centuries-long norms and values of Ireland’s peace policy: the right to self-determination and independence; the notion of equality of nations regardless of size; resistance to the usurpation of natural rights of peoples or states; and a fearless determination to uphold fundamental rights and freedoms, set in the context of a deep, conscious knowledge of the horror of war and consequences of imperialism and colonisation.

The British response to the 1916 Rising had a profound effect on Imperialist thinkers like Redmond, who came to admit the validity of Connolly’s reasoning, “That the system of government at present maintained in Ireland is inconsistent with the principle for which the Allies are fighting in Europe, and is, or has been, mainly responsible for the recent unhappy events, and for the present state of feeling in that country.” (Wells 1919: 194) It was said of O’Higgins that “the more he thought about the matter the more he was convinced that England was not at war for Belgium, but for her own self-preservation. He was not at all convinced that England’s success would benefit Ireland or that the fight to save small nations showed any change of heart on England’s part towards the small nation at her doorstep.” (de Vere White 1948: 13)

Between 1919 and 1921 a War of Independence was fought by regular British forces (assisted by the “Black and Tans”) against the Irish Volunteers who were being marshalled into a foundational army for the republic, known as the Irish Republican Army or the IRA. (Lyons 1971: 408) A truce was declared on 11 July 1921 and negotiations lead to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921. The Treaty was to lead to a new constitution and the establishment of a self-governing Irish Free State with ‘dominion status’ separate from Britain by the end of 1922, consisting of just twenty-six of the thirty-
two counties, with the Unionist-dominated six north-eastern counties of “Northern Ireland” under British governance. By 29 June 1922, civil war took hold across Ireland between the pro-Treaty Provisional Government under Michael Collins and its anti-Treaty opponents. The anti-Treaty side, including Éamon de Valera, called off the war upon a proposal from Frank Aiken and negotiated a ceasefire on 24 May 1923.

**Governing by Irish peace norms: Éamon de Valera in the 1900s**

Despite the restraints on the conduct of external relations imposed in the 1922 Constitution, the Irish Free State applied to the League of Nations as a fully self-governing state, not as a Dominion, with the expectation “that with her place in the Assembly, Ireland could be a small but effective presence as a voice for world peace” (Kennedy 1996: 29). On 10th September 1923, the Irish Free State was admitted as a member to the League of Nations and took its membership of the League seriously, but not uncritically.

**Identity and Values**

Through his leadership in the early years of the Irish state, Éamon de Valera cemented the norms, discourses and practices of Ireland’s peace policy: he promoted Ireland’s independence; wrote the Irish Constitution of 1937; secured Irish neutrality during World War II and with that, the Irish state and her people. And in what was considered the best speech ever made by a President of the Council at the League of Nations on 26 September 1932 (Gageby 1999: 37), Éamon de Valera outlined the fundamentals of Ireland’s peace policy:

… *we in Ireland desire peace, peace at home and throughout the world*. In spite of the opinions you may have formed from misleading reports, I want you to know that our history is the history of a people who have consistently sought only to be allowed to lead their own lives in their own way, in peace with their neighbours and with the world. *If we are left free, our way will be the way of peace*, of thinking in terms, not of selfish interest, not of the acquisition of territory, nor of petty power, but of human beings living as they have a right to live, in the best that their own energies and our State can give them, *whilst contributing to the world the best that is in us*.

These signifiers – independence, self-determination, global cosmopolitanism, anti-colonisation, anti-imperialism – are omitted in later Irish leaders’ discourses on Irish foreign policy due to their desire for Ireland to become a member of the EEC, and in response to pressures to join NATO and engage in power projection through a European foreign policy identity from the Six EEC members throughout the 1960s (Devine 2011: 339-340).

**The sedimentation of Ireland’s peace norms: Irish neutrality in World War II**

Security was the primary concern underpinning Taoiseach Éamon de Valera’s official declaration of neutrality in September 1939. (Bowman 1982: 254) The legacy of British rule had left Ireland without an arms industry and adequate defence resources. British and American governments refused requests to purchase arms (Dwyer 1977: 177); the Germans’ offer was turned down. Instead, the Irish government created “[... a force which will be able, under ordinary circumstances, to protect our neutrality.” (DÉ Vol. 74: Col. 715) De Valera “thought it madness to become involved in a conflict, which had basically resulted from the various powers pursuing their own self-interests” (Dwyer 1982: 182). Seán Lester, who took over as acting Secretary General of the League of Nations in 1940,
further explained the rationale for Irish neutrality in World War II, highlighting its remarkable benevolence towards Britain:

It makes me rather tired however if any outsiders talk about a moral issue for a Government in Ireland not having taken that action … Some are inclined to forget that it is only 20 years ago, i.e. within the lifetime of most people in Ireland, that the Black and Tans were loosened to ravage the country. There is scarcely a criminal act of which the Germans have been guilty which did not take place in Ireland at that time, although not on the same scale … To have sided with Germany would have meant war; to have sided with England would have meant civil war, for Ireland was full not of historic memories, but of recollections of things done by English officers to Irish prisoners which were like what the Germans have been doing in this war. No-one can enjoy reading of these things, but it is right that they should be read and remembered. In spite of what happened, the Irish government adopted a most friendly and even helpful attitude in 1939. (Gageby 1999: 185)

Identity and Values

Ireland’s history of colonization, her culture, and peace norms, informed the reasons for neutrality: “A small country like ours that had for centuries resisted imperial absorption, and that still wished to preserve its separate national identity, was bound to choose the course of neutrality.” (de Valera, “Wheat and Arms” Irish Independent, 18 March 1941) A Dáil Éireann debate on 16 February 1939 provides several additional reasons for neutrality including (1) its embodiment of an identity of non-aggression, to prove to other nations that Ireland was not in alliance with Britain and had no designs on other nations (Norton, DÉ Vol. 74: Col. 666-667); (2) to avoid a likely civil war (Mac Fheórais DÉ Vol. 138: Col. 842-843) and (3) because neutrality also reflected Ireland’s identity as having a tradition of resistance to threats, bullying and actions that are against Ireland’s interests and the interests of mankind (de Valera DÉ Vol. 74: Col. 709-710). Ireland maintained a steadfast resistance to being dragged into the war, by military aggression, economic pressure, or by the starvation policies of the allied coalition. (Aiken DÉ Vol. 138: Col. 853) De Valera consistently impressed upon the belligerents the democratic framework underpinning neutrality - neutrality was supported by the Irish public and political elite alike (de Valera, Wheat and Arms Irish Independent, 18 March 1941; Aiken DÉ Vol. 138: Col. 859; Cowen DÉ Vol. 138: Col. 834-835).

De Valera’s internationalism underpinned his hope of friendship between the peoples of Britain and Ireland even though it may take 50-100 years to develop if it could (McMahon 1984: 225). His agreement to an ideal of “a world-wide commonwealth of free nations” is contiguous with his speeches at the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation, and cannot be interpreted as a desire to maintain British rule, Empire or Commonwealth per se. Given his extensive experience of warring struggles for Irish independence and neutrality, de Valera was deeply sceptical of the intentions of Big Powers and the ability of small states to influence Big Power-led decisions in regional organisations such as the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Ireland did not join NATO primarily because public opinion would never agree because of a strong and unyielding preference for neutrality: “it would provoke a civil war in this country” (Mac Fheórais, DÉ Vol. 138: Col. 842) and because Ireland could not afford to double defence expenditure to meet the average expenditure of NATO members based on a proportion of GNP. (Lyons 1969: 68) Loss of independence was a prime concern, in
anticipation that members would seek to co-ordinate foreign policy positions in a manner that could require the subordination of Ireland’s position (Wylie 2006: 45). Pro-NATO academics and elites cite an interpretation of Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty as “implying an undertaking to preserve the Partition situation” (Attitude to Atlantic Treaty, *Irish Times*, 27 April 1950) as a reason, despite vigorous government denials. (DÉ Vol. 193: Col. 11) However, Ireland continued to resist US pressure for military obligations, for example, refusing Marshall Aid conditional on contributions to the “defensive strength of the free world” because it would alter “established foreign policy…by undertaking to render military assistance to other nations.” (Salmon 1989: 167)

**Big Power scepticism** also fed into de Valera’s views on the nascent European Economic Community and its pre-emptory European Defence Community: he argued “we would not be wise as a nation in entering into a full-blooded political federation” that would involve a military alliance (DÉ Vol. 152: Cols. 549-551; Wylie 2006: 45) because of the significant likelihood that small states’ peace policy positions would be ignored. Initially the United Nations (UN) appeared to be a tool of the great powers (Kennedy 1997: 249) but after joining the UN in 1955, de Valera continued his tradition of small power activism and appointed Frank Aiken as Minister for External Affairs in 1957, who established an Irish identity at the United Nations that equaled the autonomous activist posture assumed at the League of Nations. (Skelly 1997: 92)

### Practicing Irish peace norms: Frank Aiken at the United Nations in the mid-1900s

Frank Aiken aspired to play a similar role in the UN to de Valera’s in the League. (Skelly 1997: 96) He was the last military commander of the anti-Treaty forces in 1923, but his heart was not in the civil war. He managed to reconcile the army to the new regime in persuading old enemies to cooperate, and repeated the same feat in uniting the country behind the policy of neutrality in World War II. (Skelly 1997: 96) His conciliatory nature and ability to put aside feelings of ill-will, (for example, stemming from US hostility to Ireland’s neutrality or his mission to buy wheat and arms in the US for Ireland in March 1941) meant that Aiken never took an anti-US or anti-British line at the UN.

### Identity and Values

Frank Aiken was equally reluctant to be intimidated by the Big Powers in the pursuit of peace:

Aiken’s revolutionary background had a long-lasting impact that surfaced occasionally at the UN. Having confronted British military might one could hardly imagine Aiken being intimidated by a UN member offended by an unexpected Irish vote or initiative, particularly if it was the United Kingdom. The nature of the Irish military campaign, with its reliance on guerrilla tactics, fostered patience and persistence. (Skelly 1997: 94)

Aiken’s diplomacy skills, hewn from his experiences of war in Ireland, were applied at the UN, just as Seán Lester’s were applied at the League of Nations some twenty years before. Éamon de Valera highlighted this identity established at the League of Nations:

On a few occasions in Geneva, representatives of foreign States said: “You are the most independent State in Geneva,” because we are not liable to be threatened or bullied by any State into taking any action which did not commend itself to us from our view of what was good for our
nation, which we are representing, and for mankind in so far as we have any say in universal matters. (DÉ Vol. 74: Col. 710)

Policy

Neutrality emerged from this period of three hundred years of Irish nationalist leaders’ discourses, not only as a principle of foreign policy directed at the achievement of peace and a refusal to aid colonialism and imperialism, it also constituted a basis of Ireland’s moral concerns and international involvement (McSweeney 1985: 120-121). From the mid-1950s, neutrality was seen by a majority of political elites and Irish public opinion as a positive token of Ireland’s contribution to peace and disarmament in the world at the United Nations Organisation. (McSweeney 1985: 122)

Integrity

Both leaders’ principled natures and consistent adherence to peace norms would predict neither were corrupt and there is no evidence to the contrary: de Valera lived a notably frugal way of life, from clothes to eating and drinking habits. State Department despatches record that “no cleric ever lived a more austere life than de Valera” (McMahon 1984: 42), whilst Aiken openly criticised corruption at all levels of government from local authorities to the level of ministry, “the gentlemen who are corrupt in matters of hundreds and thousands of pounds.” (DÉ Vol. 39: Col. 528)

Changes to peace norms of Irish foreign policy

Having identified early Irish leaders’ conceptions of Irish peace policy, attention now turns to a forensic analysis of shifts from the established tradition of independence and neutrality-wrapped norms of Irish peace policy to an interests-based, Great Power-aligned, EU-led foreign policy undertaken by leaders from Seán Lemass (1950s-60s) up to and including Bertie Ahern (1990s-2000s). To test the working hypothesis, each leader’s level of association with corruption and political patronage is noted (summarised later in Table 2).

The beginning of the end of the tradition of Irish ‘peace’ norms: Seán Lemass in the 1960s

“EC states were hostile to the continuation of Irish neutrality” (Keatinge, 1985: 175; see Maher (1986) and Keogh (1997)) to such a degree that the Irish Government elites felt it prudent to deny EEC demands to eradicate neutrality, in order to achieve EEC membership in the face of public desire to retain neutrality. The policy of denial involved (1) the “Lemass doctrine”, whereby Taoiseach Seán Lemass, at a private social event in July 1962, said to the New York Times foreign editor, C. L. Sulzberger, “We are prepared to go into this integrated Europe without reservations as to how far this will take us in the field of foreign policy and defence.” (Maher 1986: 152) This line was iterated only outside of Ireland to respective external target audiences (Keogh, 1989: 234) and denied by the government; (2) denial and deliberate obfuscation in parliament by being evasive in answering questions about changes to neutrality-oriented Irish Foreign policy norms (e.g. “it may be affected in some degree following on our membership of the European Economic Community”,

Lemass DÉ Vol. 193: Col. 22-23, emphasis added) and White Papers (e.g. “Our obligations as a member of the Communities will not entail such [military or defence] commitments” (Hillery DÉ Col. 259: Vol. 2445)) and (3) a deliberately misleading accession referendum campaign denying the implications of EEC membership for neutrality.

The lead-up to Ireland’s accession to the EEC coincided with a concentration of political power in the hands of a few politicians; a new culture whereby political elite regularly attempted to implement policy without reference to cabinet, parliament or the people (Farrell 1983: 106-107); control of party members’ interaction with the media; and crucially, the cultivation of wealthy and powerful businessmen for finance purposes, in exchange for looking after their interests. These businessmen and industry elites were also agents behind the drive for each of the four neutral states’ EEC memberships, together with individual elites from the Department of Finance and the Prime Minister offices in Ireland (Maher 1986: 86, 117; Devine 2009: 475), Sweden, Austria (Bieler 2000: 84, 87) and Finland (Rauino and Tiilikainen 2003: 39, 40), including the defence sector in the latter states. Lemass saw EEC membership as a way to attract foreign direct investment into Irish industry (Evans 2011: 203). Instrumental, materialist considerations were driving the elite pursuit of the economic benefits of membership, rather than the socialization of elites into the political norms and visions of the EEC/EU. (Devine 2011: 347) This connection between the Taoisigh and business elites is implicated in peace norms and neutrality being casualties under Lemass’s regime, as economic considerations were prioritised above moral considerations at the UN.

Activist identity: the beginning of the end

In January 1962, Lemass anticipated that Ireland’s “membership of a European Community may alter in some degree our role in the United Nations” (quoted in Skelly 1997: 236) and there is an extensive literature on these significant changes and reversals of Irish peace policy ethos (Keatinge 1973: 201; McSweeney 1985: 123; Skelly 1997: 225; see also Breathnach 2005: 182 in Gillessen 2007; Dorr 2002: 116; Spelman 2005: 252). During Ireland’s EEC accession negotiations, France had criticised Ireland for a UN policy more associated with non-alignment than with Western interests. (Spelman, 2005: 252) France, Italy and other EC members had resolutely opposed Aiken’s Non Proliferation Treaty (Spelman 2005: 229). France led the opposition of the permanent members of the Security Council to Aiken’s proposals for successive resolutions on the inscription of the financing of peacekeeping from 1965-1968, because continuing with voluntary subscriptions afforded these states an effective financial veto over the UN (Spelman 2005: 226). The era of Ireland’s autonomous identity ended because Lemass did not want to provoke French displeasure over Bizerte or Algeria (he diluted traditional Irish policy in support of Algerian self-determination (Evans 2011: 224-6)), nor Italian ill-will over South Tyrol (Skelly 1997: 234). Ireland’s first application to the EEC in 1961 was opposed by the US who didn’t want the “neutrals” joining the EEC (Kaiser 1997: 22-23; Skelly 1997: 211); to avoid generating US fury over China in the hope of securing US support for the EEC application and to “gain the Yankee dollar”, Lemass instructed Aiken to reverse his support for China’s membership that had been the hallmark Ireland’s independent, energetic role at the UN (Skelly 1997: 234-235; Evans, 2011: 224-6). Joseph Skelly speculates (1997: 235) that had de Valera been Taoiseach, he would have authorised Aiken to abstain on the 1961 China vote to safeguard Ireland’s activist reputation at the UN.
Independent policy positions: the beginning of the end

Seán Lemass’s replacement of Aiken with Patrick Hillery and the accompanying shift in policy “were signs of Ireland’s increasing identification with Europe and with its impending admission to the EEC.” (Spelman 2005: 252) Put more succinctly by Bill McSweeney (1985: 123), “The Aiken policy declined as Brussels beckoned.” Lemass reversed Aiken’s ambitious troop withdrawal scheme for central Europe because it was not in sync with NATO doctrine and made a point of informing the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of his new priorities (Skelly 1997: 170, 241). Lemass had also pushed for Ireland’s membership of NATO without consulting his cabinet and in the belief that public opinion should fall in line with this new policy. (Evans, 2011: 225) (In the intervening period, Irish public opinion on membership of NATO has not softened: a 1996 MRBI opinion poll showed that just 13% of Irish people would be willing for Ireland to join NATO. (Poll shows a symbolic support for neutrality, Irish Times, 5 March 1996)) Under Lemass’s leadership, scholars note a deliberate decision to uphold a moderate line, even if this seemed to contradict the identification between Ireland and the struggling colonies that Frank Aiken had made explicit in his earlier speeches at the UN (Bhreatnach 2005: 182).

Lemass thought it best for Ireland to maintain a low profile at the UN. Explaining why, he told Aiken that ‘having regard to our vital interests in retaining Italian goodwill during the EEC negotiations, it is very important that we should not come into any conflict with them …’ (Skelly 1997: 225)

Values-driven Voting: the beginning of the end

In studies of Irish voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly over a fifty year period, scholars saw fit to “note some shifts over time, in particular after 1960 – at the time of Ireland’s first application to the EEC – and after 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union.” (Gillissen 2007: 69) A study by Young and Rees from 1990 to 2002 concludes that “Ireland’s neutral and progressive voting history has been changing since the 1990s.” (2005: 207) Academics feared that “both Irish politicians and foreign policy officials will hide behind the EC claiming both that the Community is the principal medium through which it must act while at the same time using the EC as an excuse for inaction.” (Holmes et. al. 1993: 141-142) These fears were realised thereafter through the government’s claims that EU membership and the formation of a common [foreign policy] position means that there is “less opportunity to state a distinctive Irish position on many issues” (Dorr 2002: 115) and that “Ireland should look increasingly to its interests rather than to ideals which may have been appropriate to another bygone era.” (Dorr 2002: 119)

Integrity: the beginning of the end

Lemass manipulated colleagues and journalists, and regularly lied to and bullied others for his own ends. Brian Farrell notes,

After de Valera things would never be the same, nor would Lemass wish it otherwise….his words tended to be acerbic rather than inspiring; the images scornful rather than uplifting; the tone provocative rather than persuasive. (1983: 98-99)
Variously described as “gruff” and “curt”, “Typically he appeared reserved, controlled, detached” but “He was capable of showing anger….of stimulating anger” (Farrell 1983: 106, 123): “Those who had worked close to de Valera were most conscious of the change: with the Chief they were almost part of the family; under the Boss they were part of a Machine.” (Farrell 1983: 111)

In terms of corruption, Lemass was singled out in Dáil Éireann: “there is no person with a more dishonest public record.” (Farrell 1983: 100) As party leader, Seán Lemass was at the forefront of the Fianna Fáil party’s new practice of developing links with businessmen, developers and speculators, being described in 1968 as being “a real businessman” (Evans 2011: 260), and “different” from his old party colleagues who saw his practices as lacking ethics (Evans 2011: 260). Lemass accepted donations from Irish bourgeoisie who in turn expected Lemass to look favourably on their business empires. (Evans 2011: 82-83) Patronage was at the heart of Lemass’ political career. (Evans 2011: 81, 170, 256) An avid gambler weighed down by debts, Lemass was offered a number of directorships with firms that helped ease his financial problems (Evans 2011: 160-161).

Much of the elite socialisation literature overlooks material, incentives-based relations between industry captains, corporate and business elites, and the political elite to explain policy change at the EU level: in this case, the variables of corruption and political patronage are associated with reversals of Irish peace policy norms.

Continued inconsistency in ‘peace’ norms: Charles Haughey and Garret FitzGerald in the 1980s

Charles Haughey was Taoiseach before and after Garret FitzGerald’s tenures in the office: both men engaged in reversals of positions on Irish foreign policy peace norms and neutrality. Haughey argued in Dáil Éireann (Vol. 359: Col. 1977) that

those who consciously or unconsciously are seeking to force us to abandon our neutrality are foolish in failing to appreciate the potential value of Irish neutrality to the Community in the international arena. Our neutrality emphasises the peaceful nature of the Community. Haughey also argued from the opposition benches for the inclusion of a legally binding protocol on Irish neutrality to the Single European Act as a necessary condition of the state’s acceptance of the EC treaty revision, but once in office, settled for a non-binding and ultimately meaningless declaration. His u-turns on peace norms and neutrality (see Devine 2009: 476-477; 2011: 346-347) coincided with entering office and were driven by political expediency rather than core values, indicating a lack of integrity in his stances on peace norms.

Bryce Evans argues that Seán Lemass “has consistently escaped the revisionist’s noose” (2011: 1) and critiques the mainstream construction of Lemass, positing that it “involved a considerable amount of airbrushing” (Evans 2011: 3) and is characterised by “the intellectual laziness of hero worship” (Evans 2011: 4): evidence indicates that the same issues arise with discourses constructing FitzGerald.

Identity and Values

In a Dáil Éireann Debate on 28 October 1969, Garret FitzGerald noted the core purpose of Irish foreign policy:
what we are seeking to achieve in our foreign policy, is to give effect to our belief in the value of maintaining the national identity of this country — our belief, which we asserted in arms 50 years ago, that Irish interests are best served by a separate, individual, Irish presence in the world. (Vol. 241: Col. 1994)

He acknowledged Ireland’s values of anti-imperialism and that Ireland’s track record of independent decision-making had earned her some respect, and “because we … are not involved in the military alliance of the Western European countries. Therefore, we can be more of an honest broker” - all of which were qualities that would be useful “in seeking to preserve peace.” (Vol. 241: Cols 2006-2007)

**Policy and Integrity**

Yet, FitzGerald was one of the most disingenuous and dishonest political elites on the issue of neutrality: in his revisionist discourses on membership of the WEU and NATO over the next forty years of his political career, he maligned important aspects of Ireland’s ‘natural born peacemaker’ role. For example, in public discourse, FitzGerald claimed that the Irish voting public knew that an EU collective defence ambition was part of their acceptance of EEC membership in a 1972 referendum: “in 1961 Seán Lemass made it clear that we accepted the principle of an eventual European defence policy…upon which the 1972 referendum was largely fought.” (Military Neutrality Immoral, Despite Virtuous Irish Claims, *Irish Times* 14–15 April 1995) However, a vigilant member of the public vigorously corrected FitzGerald: “the government of the day and others campaigning for a “yes” vote deliberately and criminally narrowed the focus of the debate to purely economic issues, shutting out the wider implications of the decision being made…I have the speeches, the notes and the paper cuttings to prove [it]” (The makers of myths, *Irish Times* 28 April 1995). It was a devious and dishonest campaign tactic that FitzGerald himself later admitted to pursuing (FitzGerald 2002: 80-81) and he continued to promote government discourses through ‘secondary diplomacy’, think-tank and media activities that neutrality was safeguarded, up to and including the second Lisbon Treaty referendum (Lisbon Treaty’s less publicised elements provide a compelling argument to vote yes, *Irish Times* 26 September 2009). This tactic of misinformation has made it difficult to discern and empirically evaluate whether Irish people have ever voted to reject neutrality in favour of economic benefits. Finally, as Ireland’s Foreign Minister, FitzGerald repeatedly maligned Irish neutrality and his predecessor Éamon de Valera’s conduct of neutrality during World War II (Devine 2008b: 74, 76, 91), appearing to take special delight in spreading mistruths (e.g. the book of condolences myth) among other EC Foreign Ministers (Walking a wartime tightrope, *Irish Times* 28 June 2003).

**Corruption**

The proceedings of a Tribunal of Inquiry into Payments to Politicians and Related Matters (the “Moriarty Tribunal”) yielded information that former Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald was forgiven a debt of nearly IR £ 200’000 – roughly equivalent to the value of four houses given that the average house price in Ireland in 1993 was IR £ 53’000 – by Allied Irish Banks (AIB) and Ansbacher bank, after his attempt to profit from the flotation of a company he was a director of, failed. (FitzGerald to give evidence on his settlement with AIB, hearing told, *Irish Times* 5 December 2000; Garret Fitzgerald has confirmed that
AIB and Ansbacher wrote off debts of almost IR £ 200'000 that he owed them six years ago, RTÉ News 27 February 1999) FitzGerald sold his house to his son and remained living in the house whilst retaining ownership of a second house bought some months earlier in February 1992 for IR £ 47'000: he paid back 22.5% of the debt (FitzGerald says second house of no use to banks, Irish Times February 22 1999). Former Taoiseach Charles Haughey paid back 68% of debts of over IR £ 1 million he owed to AIB (Ireland 2006a: 47) with the tribunal suspecting that 60% of the money came from unknown sources in the form of donations (Ireland 2006a: 71). Comparing the two cases, the Moriarty Tribunal report found that “As in Mr. Haughey’s case, there was a substantial discounting or forbearance shown in Dr. Fitzgerald’s case” (Ireland 2006a: 52). Although implicated in other dealings, and suspected to be on a much larger scale, Haughey is widely considered as corrupt (Obituary: Charles Haughey, BBC News Europe 13 June 2006), whereas FitzGerald retains a ‘Garret the Good’ moniker, despite the fact that abuse of office and patronage are indicated (although not proven to the letter of the law) to be involved in the accrual of each man’s personal benefits, and neither man can be considered as having acted ethically. Notably, regarding this and the following era, the Mahon Tribunal declared

Throughout that [late 1980s to late 1990s] period, corruption in Irish political life was both endemic and systemic. It affected every level of Government from some holders of top ministerial offices to some local councillors and its existence was widely known and widely tolerated. (Ireland 2012a: 1)

No cognisance was taken of the fact that, as Taoiseach, FitzGerald presided over the Irish Government acquisition of ICI from the Allied Irish Banks (AIB) Group for a nominal sum on 15 March 1985, justified by his government’s view that “the bank could not prudently persist in the attempt to resolve the problems of ICI without the risk of adverse effects on their banking operations” (DÉ Vol. 357: Col. 698) despite the fact that AIB’s profits the previous year were IR £ 80 million. As part of the bailout, AIB received an interest-free loan of IR £ 100 million from the Exchequer in 1985; ten years later, the Department of Finance, appearing before the Dáil Select Committee on Public Accounts, estimated the overall cost to the taxpayer at IR £ 400 million. (Top bank again hits headlines for the wrong reasons, Irish Times 8 May 2004) Nor was there any analysis of FitzGerald’s appointment of Peter Sutherland to the role of European Commissioner in 1985 (FitzGerald’s government had previously appointed him Attorney General in 1981 and 1982), a position he enjoyed until 1989 whereupon he became Chairman of AIB up to and including the time when FitzGerald’s favourable write-off was made in 1993. The state broadcast organisation merely quoted FitzGerald as saying “he believed his then Fine Gael colleague Peter Sutherland, who was chairman of AIB at the time, was unaware of the situation.” (RTÉ News, op. cit.)

Completing the reversals of Irish peace policy norms: John Bruton and Bertie Ahern, 1990s–2000s

This final section will elaborate the new practices and policy u-turns impacting on traditional Irish peace norms including (1) a change in mission focus from UN peacekeeping to EU “crisis management” and NATO “peace support” missions, (2) Ireland’s adoption of the Lisbon Treaty provisions on a common security and defence policy including joining the new EU collective defence in order to improve the Union’s capacity to shape globaliza-
tion (Barroso, 2007) and (3) the eradication of Irish neutrality. As opposition leader and then Taoiseach overseeing these policy reversals, Bertie Ahern has notably similar behavioral characteristics to Seán Lemass.

Reformulation and redefinition of neutrality, including its disassociation from peace policy

Neutrality started to be pared down by the government and its various elements chipped off and discarded as the EU moved closer to its defence policy ambitions of incorporating the WEU military alliance into the EU and having the neutrals accede to the merged alliance. (Neutrals must join NATO - Kohl aide, Irish Times, 10 March 1995) The 1980s was the last time the Irish government admitted that neutrality permitted the elements of active neutrality or what the government termed, the “‘positive merits’ of Irish foreign policy: UN peacekeeping, the nuclear non proliferation treaty, decolonization initiatives, opposing South African apartheid, accepting refugees, opposing US funding of South American paramilitaries, increasing aid to the Third World, and supporting Palestinian self-determination.” (DÉ Vol. 327: Col. 1425–1426 in Devine 2009: 478; see Devine 2009 for changing party discourses on neutrality and ESDP over four decades)

Members of the EU’s Council of Ministers were continuously hostile to Irish neutrality, as a former Irish Minister from 1994 to 1997 recalled: “I sat for a long time at the general affairs council beside a Minister from another country who could not understand why Ireland was neutral. Barbed comments were often made about it.” (Mitchell DÉ Vol. 489 Col. 15) The European Commission was equally hostile to the continuation of Austrian, Finnish and Swedish neutrality during their accession negotiations (European Commission 1992: 18) and suggested neutrality be effectively defined out of existence because of its incompatibility with future EU defence policy: the concept was narrowed to just one characteristic, non-membership of a military alliance (i.e. the broader ‘active’ neutrality policy attributes were stripped out) and re-named ‘military neutrality’. (See Devine 2011: 347-349)

Policy Reversal: Extension of EU political cooperation to military affairs

Up until the end of the 1980s, successive Irish governments were against (1) any EC role in military affairs and security and defence policy:

Our positive neutrality is aimed at the promotion of peace as has been clearly established already by Ireland’s traditional attitude to decolonisation, disarmament and peace-keeping issues in the United Nations. It is being suggested that European political co-operation should be extended to military affairs. We are totally opposed to this idea. (Collins DÉ Vol. 359: Col. 1994)

(2) the merger of the WEU with the EU, and (3) signing up to the WEU’s mutual defence clause or any version of a collective defence commitment (DÉ Vol. 359: Col. 1977-1978), but by the early 2000s, the government had reversed all three positions. Because relinquishing neutrality would be seen by Irish public opinion and NGOs as negatively affecting world peace, the government constructed a new, strikingly passive-aggressive mantra to use in political discourse: “Neutrality policy has also been informed by the view that military neutrality on its own is not sufficient to maintain conditions of peace and security internationally” (Kitt DÉ Vol. 561: Col. 1005; Cowen DÉ Vol. 565: Col. 62) and sought to justify participation in EU CSDP with a discourse characterising the EU as a peace
project, implying naïvely and simplistically that through support for any and all EU policies, peace is achieved (Dukes DÉ Vol. 463: Col. 1275).

Policy Reversal: WEU-EU merger

In June 1995, the governing German Christian Democrats and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel separately called for the EU to play a more significant defence role, proposing the gradual merger of the EU with the Western European Union, the European arm of NATO, and demanded the neutral states join it (Germans urge majority EU voting on foreign policy, Irish Times 14 June 1995; Kinkel wants WEU and EU to merge gradually, Irish Times 20 June 1995). In Opposition, Fianna Fáil leader Bertie Ahern rejected the WEU-EU merger planned for inclusion in the Amsterdam Treaty: “We do not want to see the EU/WEU amalgamation or the incorporation in the Treaty of alliance obligations or nuclear doctrines” (Ahern DÉ Vol. 473: Col. 608). In government office some months later, on 15 June 1999, the then Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated in the Dáil:

the question of integration of the Western European Union as an institution into the EU is problematic and should be dropped. The related issue of the Western European Union’s Article V mutual defence commitment should be left to one side (Andrews DÉ Vol. 506: Col. 197)

in spite of the fact that the Ahern-led government had actually agreed to the WEU-EU merger in 1999, including the final element of the merger, the transfer of the Article V mutual defence clause to the EU, which happened through the 2004 Constitution for Europe (re-constituted as the Lisbon Treaty and ratified by the Irish government in 2009) (see Devine 2011).

Policy Reversal: Ireland’s WEU Membership and assumption of its mutual defence clause

Thirdly, this WEU membership through the ‘back door’ of the merger overturned official Government policy that “the Government will not be proposing that Ireland should seek membership of NATO or the Western European Union, or the assumption of their mutual defence guarantees” (Ireland 1996: 147), subsequently reiterated by the Ahern-led government in parliament: “Ireland is not a member of the Western European Union and has no intention of joining it.” (O’Keeffe DÉ Vol. 488: Col. 352) Past Irish leaders would not have entered into this arrangement given their consistent adherence to peace policy norms under considerably bigger pressures from Great Powers - “we have to be careful once there is a suggestion of entering into arrangements which involve military alliances” (de Valera DÉ Vol. 152: Col. 551) and would have resisted the undemocratic, dishonest and patronage-ridden tactics employed by the four EU Big Powers to secure the merger (see Devine 2011). This episode underlines the importance of leaders, their values, and personal integrity, in understanding changes to peace norms in Irish foreign policy.

Policy Reversal: The Meaning of the Concept of ‘Military Neutrality’

In 2003, the White Paper on Irish Foreign Policy’s minimalistic characterisation of neutrality as “expressed through peace-time through Ireland’s decision to abstain from membership of military alliances” (Ireland 1996: 51) was whittled down further to “non-membership of military alliances, and specifically, non-membership of an alliance with a
mutual defence commitment” (Cowen, DÉ Vol. 563: Col. 722, 20 March 2003) by the Ahern-led government, to permit involvement in proposals for a WEU-EU alliance that featured the WEU’s mutual defence clause as an ‘opt-in’ protocol to the draft Constitution for Europe. By early 2004, neutrality was narrowed down further to non-membership of “pre-existing military alliances with mutual automatic obligations” (Rigid Approach to Neutrality Could Jeopardise Role in EU, Irish Times 24 January 2004, emphasis added) to fit the neutrals’ proposed Constitution amendment for states’ military responses to be optional rather than automatic i.e. “it may request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power” (see Devine 2011: 345). The Irish and other neutral state governments failed to have their amendment adopted: the WEU’s automatic mutual defence clause was inserted into the full text of the Constitution/Lisbon Treaty (see Devine 2011: 353-354 for details), which, once ratified, resulted in the eradication of Irish ‘military’ neutrality and effectively changed the governments’ ‘military neutrality’ concept to mean membership of this merged WEU military alliance.

Policy Reversal: Adopting ‘sharp end of peacekeeping’ WEU Petersberg Tasks & NATO-led missions

Ahern had agreed with the White Paper that “neutrality has come to be regarded as a touchstone in terms of our approach to international relations” and added “we are under no obligation to associate with pre-existing Cold War and nuclear based military alliances, even for peace-keeping purposes.” (DÉ Vol. 463: Col. 1321-22, emphasis added) Ahern reversed this policy seemingly without any level of serious debate regarding the legitimacy or effectiveness of PfP-linked NATO ‘peace support’ or WEU Petersberg Task ‘crisis management’ operations, stating a need to accept “organisational realities in Europe” and “the settled preference of all our partners to work mainly with and through existing structures in developing the common European foreign and security policy” (DÉ Vol. 479: Col. 654), i.e. WEU and NATO. Despite the United Nations perspective in the Brahimi Report that “the growth in European regional peacekeeping initiatives further depletes the pool of well-trained and well-equipped military contingents from developed countries to serve in United Nations-led operations” (2000: 18), the government was more concerned with constructing the EU as a global actor, seen through its claim that Ireland should participate to “signal the strength of the EU’s capability to undertake a robust and large-scale mission.” (Ireland, 2004)

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) website (under Policies=>International Relations=>Foreign Policy) summarises the new priorities: “for fifty years [Ireland] has been an active contributor to UN and UN-mandated peacekeeping operations and is playing an active part in the development of European Security and Defence Policy”. (Ireland 2013, emphasis added) In July 2006, the Defence (Amendment) Act, written to allow Irish troops to participate in EU Battlegroups, was guillotined and passed without adequate democratic debate and scrutiny; the bill stretched the definition of “International United Nations Force” in a manner considered by Opposition parties as “too broad and open to abuse” (Green Party 2006: 3), citing the example of the USA’s and UK’s insistence that their invasion of Iraq was in line with UN resolutions and the UN Charter. Academics proffer that the Irish government has been “neither honest nor realistic” in executing “a clear move away from traditional UN operations in favour of the post Cold War model of ‘tendered out’ or delegated peace support operations.” (Murphy 2002: 33)
Policy Shift: Support for the Iraq War

War time is the ultimate testing ground of a state’s peace policy: the Irish government’s decision to permit the transit of hundreds of thousands of US soldiers through Shannon airport on their way to the Iraq War in 2003 set it apart from other European neutrals. The government maintained it had to “define neutrality in a very complex set of circumstances; the value of international friendships and the expectations that come with those friendships.” (Cowen DÉ Vol. 563: Col. 723-724) The decision to aid belligerents in war is against the neutrality-oriented peace policy of the state, including article 2 of the Fifth Hague Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. (October 18, 1907) The government insisted “Irish neutrality is a policy choice and is not defined exclusively on the basis of international legal instruments such as the Hague Convention of 1907” (Cowen DÉ Vol. 565: Col. 629) whilst re-iterating the new mantra, “Neutrality policy has also been informed by the view that military neutrality on its own is not sufficient to maintain conditions of peace and security internationally.”

Policy Shift: From Commitment to the UN itself to a Commitment to the Principles of its Charter

The past tense used in government discourses on Irish foreign policy and the UN, e.g. “The United Nations has been a cornerstone of Irish foreign policy” (Ireland 1996: 150), is an additional subtle indicator of the move from Ireland’s traditional commitment to the United Nations Organisation, to a commitment to the principles of the UN Charter. This shift, first initiated under Seán Lemass to conform to perceived demands of EEC membership (Skelly 1997: 247, 245), was given a new justificatory twist in the 1990s by Lemass’s protégés: the need for UN reform (Dukes DÉ Vol. 463: Col. 1280).

Policy Shift: Meaningful Silence on Neutrality and a New Foreign Policy Cornerstone - EU ‘solidarity’

In the discourses of many Irish parliamentarians, neutrality continued to be synonymous with the state’s quest for international peace throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (DÉ Vol. 306: Col. 388, 4th May 1978; DÉ Vol. 377: Col. 443-444, 28 January 1988), e.g. “the Irish people are proud of our neutrality …defined in terms of … the contemporary attempt to pursue world peace and justice. We are proud of our policy and we will adhere to it.” (DÉ Vol. 463: Col. 1335-1336, 28 March 1996) Continuing into the 2000s, Irish public opinion data shows that those most supportive of neutrality define it in peace-promotion terms (Devine 2006: 102), such that neutrality’s function as a signifier of Irish peace policy and the (ultimately successful) EEC/EU demands for its removal continues to be contentious. In response, political parties have placed neutrality in a zone of meaningful silence in political discourse, evinced by unofficial inter-party agreements that are especially evident during the campaigns to pass referendums on EU Treaties (e.g. Fine Gael with Fianna Fáil for the Lisbon Treaty campaigns). (Huff 2011: 9, 11)

EU security and defence ‘solidarity’ has replaced the ‘ neutrality’ vacuum in political discourses. Taking Austria as an example, the Christian Right ÖVP party states, “In Europe, it is not neutrality that is called for today but solidarity” (Benke 2003: 298–9); the State’s 2001 Security and Defence Doctrine section is entitled “From neutrality to solidarity” (Austria 2001: 6); and finally, Chancellor Schüssel initially regarded the [W]EU alliance
obligations proposed in late 2003 as only a modification of neutrality, but after the aforementioned failed attempt to amend the wording of the obligation, switched to the formula “solidarity within Europe, neutrality in wars outside Europe”. (Neuhold 2005: 14) This same change in the Irish case reverses previously articulated Irish concepts of EU solidarity that specifically excluded military action. (DÉ Vol. 334: Cols. 800, 802, 804)

Support for Irish peace norms and indicators of corruption / patronage: an inverse relationship

As Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern presided over each of the five aforementioned peace policy norm reversals; whilst in government, large dollar and sterling cash lodgements were made to his bank accounts, the source of which remains unexplained to this day. Ahern had appointed a number of his known donating benefactors to State boards (Four of 12 money donors have served on public boards, Irish Times 27 September 2006). A Tribunal of Inquiry into Certain Planning Matters and Payments (“the Mahon Tribunal”) found that “Much of the explanation provided by Mr Ahern as to the source of the substantial funds identified and inquired into the course of the Tribunal’s public hearings was deemed by the Tribunal to have been untrue” (Ireland 2012a: 1473, 2481) including Ahern’s explanations for sums totalling IR £ 165'000 given to him by a number of individuals, and the ownership of a house (e.g. Ireland 2012a: 1371, 1467). Referring to the actions of Ahern, and his predecessor Albert Reynolds, the report states:

The Tribunal nevertheless considered that the concept whereby senior Ministers, together with a former Government Minister and EU Commissioner closely associated with that party, would actively engage in (what amounted to in reality) pressurising a businessman, then involved in lobbying the Government to support a commercial project, to pay a substantial sum of money to that political party, was entirely inappropriate and an abuse of political power and Government. (Ireland 2012a: 730, emphasis added)

The theory of elite socialisation focuses on material rewards in terms of conditionality at the state level (Checkel 2005: 809) but omits the variable of corruption at the level of the individual political elite (Checkel 2005: 813-814), whereby actors follow a strategy of mutual enrichment, for example, the political elite, through their ability to shape legislation and policy or appoint individuals to positions of power, act in the interests of their business paymasters who reciprocate with ‘gifts’, remunerated positions, company directorships or direct payments. For Ahern and Lemass, the rewards were gained at the nation-state level; for the national representatives like John Bruton (and Austria’s Benita Ferrero-Waldner) who helped overturn their states’ past neutrality policy in favour of EU ‘solidarity’ at the EU level, the rewards were gained through institutional positions such as EU Ambassador or EU Commissioner (Devine 2011: 358). Table 2 summarises the relationship between leaders’ support for traditional Irish peace norms and evidence of their engagement in corruption or patronage, broadly conceived, which can be characterised as inverse: consistent support for Irish peace policy norms is associated with integrity and an absence of corruption indicators, whilst the absence of consistent adherence to norms is associated with the presence of indicators of apparent corruption and political patronage.

As mentioned, anecdotal reports and experts’ observations indicate that those who act in their own interests to the detriment of the common good are more likely to populate the highest echelons of business and politics than other professions (Babiak and Hare 2006: 177, 194). Individuals who can unconscionably engage in reversal of policy against
Table 2: The relationship between peace norm consistency and corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Peace Norms</th>
<th>Corrupt* Indicators</th>
<th>Values/Policy Pledged life, died for values/policy.</th>
<th>Integrity Consistent norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tone</td>
<td>“War is peremptorily evil for Ireland”; “peace with all the world ... is our object and our interest”. In considering “the question of the obligation on Ireland to follow Great Britain to war” Tone sought “arrangements to obtain and secure a safe and honourable neutrality” (1790)</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Evident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Connell</td>
<td>“A parliament in Ireland is the only means of restoring the independence, promoting the happiness of our country, securing its peace and prosperity...it is by such a Repeal only, that the peace and tranquillity of Ireland can be preserved” (1871: 17); “The people of the country caught at the sympathy offered them by their agitators, and in this sympathy was peace and harmony preserved.” (1871: 324)</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Evident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearse/Connolly</td>
<td>Founded anti-conscription Irish Neutrality League; anti imperialist “We do not wish to be ruled by either [German or British] empire” (Connolly 1916a), anti-slavery; (Pearse 1924: 8; 317); limits to exercise of violence (Connolly 1916b; Pearse 1924: 322-323) pro-universal rights, equality</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Evident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lester/Aiken</td>
<td>A good nationalist made a good internationalist; critical support for League of Nations, United Nations; deal with every problem on its merits; wariness of Big Power politics; independence and self-determination; neutrality; shortsightedness as ‘almost criminal’ in foreign policy</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Evident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Valera</td>
<td>“If we are left free, our way will be the way of peace, of thinking in terms, not of selfish interest, not of the acquisition of territory, nor of petty power, but of human beings living as they have a right to live”; international law; disarmament; neutrality; pacific settlement of international disputes; avoid military alliances; eradicate famine</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Evident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Peace Norms</th>
<th>Corrupt*</th>
<th>Values/Policy</th>
<th>Integrity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lemass</td>
<td>Instructed Aiken to reverse his previous China policy that had been the hallmark of Ireland’s independent, energetic role at the UN (Skelly 1997: 234-235); diluted past Irish policy in support of Algerian self-determination; opposed China’s membership of the UN to gain US dollars (Evans 2011: 224-6); reversed Aiken’s ambitious troop withdrawal scheme for central Europe because it was not in sync with NATO doctrine (Skelly 1997: 170, 241); contradicted the identification between Ireland and struggling colonies explicit in earlier UN speeches (Bhreatnach 2005: 182)</td>
<td>Indicator(s) present</td>
<td>Reversed ethical peace policies. Reversed norms</td>
<td>Lacking: Ignored public opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FitzGerald</td>
<td>Military neutrality facilitated ‘positive merits’ of Irish foreign policy: UN peacekeeping, nuclear non proliferation treaty, decolonization initiatives, opposing South African apartheid, accepting refugees, opposing US funding of South America paramilitaries, increasing aid to Third World, Palestinian self-determination (DÉ, Vol. 327 Col. 1425-6) vs. “military neutrality was immoral” (1995)</td>
<td>Indicator(s) present</td>
<td>Policy u-turns. Inconsistent norms</td>
<td>Lacking: Deceived public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haughey</td>
<td>“Our neutrality emphasises the peaceful nature of the Community” (DÉ Vol. 359: Col. 1977) vs. “I do not think that we have ever sought non-alliance status … I am dealing with the question of membership or non-membership of a military alliance.” (DÉ Vol. 327: Col. 534)</td>
<td>Indicator(s) present</td>
<td>Policy u-turns. Inconsistent norms</td>
<td>Lacking: Ignored public opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruton</td>
<td>Represented Ireland on ‘the need for a common European defence’ (2002: 47); “there never will be any change in our policy and Ireland will always be neutral...is dishonest because it is not sustainable” (DÉ Vol. 506: Col. 187)</td>
<td>Indicator(s) present</td>
<td>Policy u-turns. Inconsistent norms</td>
<td>Lacking: Ignored public opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahern</td>
<td>“We do not want to see the EU/WEU amalgamation or the incorporation in the Treaty of alliance obligations or nuclear doctrines” (DÉ Vol. 473: Col. 608) vs. agreed to EU-WEU amalgamation from 1999 to 2004 and committed Ireland to this new alliance-based ‘European Union’ in 2008-9</td>
<td>Indicator(s) present</td>
<td>Policy u-turns. Reversed norms</td>
<td>Lacking: Deceived public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*covers a broad definition, including indicators of (1) patronage networks and (2) “unethical” (not just provably ‘corrupt’) behaviours
public wishes in the interests of business or international organisations for personal gain are less likely to be concerned about the right thing to do, including the preservation of the integrity of peace policy norms and values. It is doubtful that the commonality of the behaviours and traits of Lemass and Ahern, Haughey, FitzGerald, and Bruton at the personal level (albeit with differing degrees on a continuum of severity) are coincidental in the context of their ease in engaging in the recorded reversals of the ethical, long-established and mass-supported peace norms in Irish Foreign Policy. The theory of elite socialisation is inadequate to account for these dynamics and either requires (1) revision to account for individuals that display neither Type I nor Type II internalisations (Checkel 2005: 811-812) or (2) substitution by a rival theory incorporating the aforementioned variables to explain political behaviour.

**Continuity in a Peace Policy Norm: Development Aid?**

One element of Ireland’s peace policy that has remained consistent is Development Aid. The Government has articulated that “Irish Aid and Development Cooperation are practical expressions of Ireland’s foreign policy commitment to peace and justice in the world” (Ireland 1996: 229) because of “a demonstrable interconnection between the economic and social well-being of all the nations of the world and the maintenance of international peace and security.” (Ireland 1996: 229)

**Identity**

Ireland’s history of famine, slavery and colonization appears to be linked to the state’s policy on aid: “Because of our history, Ireland can rightly claim to empathise with those who are suffering from disease, poverty and hunger every day around the globe” (Ireland 2006b: 3). Certainly, the memory of Ireland’s famines influences current policy, as the President of Ireland has explained, “Ireland is a first-world country with a third-world memory”; “the shadow of famine keeps us humble, indignant and determined to work for a world of true peace and prosperity for all.” (McAleese 2002) The memory is still live, as the latest Famine burial site was discovered in Kilkenny in October 2011 with remains of nearly one thousand people (Witnesses to a catastrophe, Irish Times 20 October 2011). The fight against hunger was officially designated a ‘cornerstone’ of the Irish aid programme in 2009. (Ireland 2009)

**Shift in Policy: the beginning of the end through austerity?**

Ireland’s first Bilateral Aid Programme was inaugurated in 1974. Two-thirds of the budget is normally provided for Bilateral Aid, and because Ireland’s aid is untied, in the form of grants, recipients do not accrue debt. In comparison to the DAC average, Ireland is a good donor: the Programme is of high quality with a strong poverty focus, a balanced mix of aid modalities, a policy of untied aid, good partnerships with civil society and other partners, and a high degree of public support. It was estimated in 2007 that all but € 4 million of the € 869 million expended by Irish Aid was ‘genuine aid’. (Cullen 2008) Irish Aid has had a strong geographic focus on Sub-Saharan Africa: approximately 80% of Ireland’s Overseas Development Aid goes to Africa. The government has re-committed to the target of 0.7% of GNP over successive decades, having reached its highest level of 0.59% in 2008 (see Figure 1 below). In a downward trend since, the 2013 figure is likely
to drop further to 0.47%, based on estimated GNP of €132.9bn and an allocated budget of €623 million.

Under the ECB’s ‘no bank can fail’ policy, the Irish government guaranteed up to €400 billion of liabilities of six banks that were overexposed to loans fuelled by the cheap credit coinciding with the introduction of the euro, and facilitated by systemic failure of bank regulation and political leadership at the EU and national levels, allegedly to ‘save the euro’ (Fianna Fáil finally admit truth about the bank guarantee, *Evening Herald* 25 May 2012). Two years later in November 2010, the Irish government - again under duress from the ECB and EU (Lenihan 2011) - acceded to a €85bn “programme of assistance” and an imposition of austerity that has impacted significantly on Irish Aid. With nearly 60 percent of the adjustment coming from spending cuts, an external review of Ireland’s development aid policy found that staffing levels in the Development Cooperation Division are significantly below requirements for the effective service delivery of Irish Aid (Ireland 2012b: 6). Because the “debts the ECB has imposed on Ireland not merely inhibit Ireland’s ability to deliver on the programme … but are also an arbitrary and unprecedented imposition on a country that is already unable to finance itself” (Voting No is a leap in the dark that we can’t afford, *Irish Independent* 1 April 2012) there is little prospect of funding effective service delivery of Ireland’s development aid programme.

### Integrity

Appropriately, (1) the government invoked Seán Lemass, and (2) Garret FitzGerald came out of retirement, to persuade the Irish people to support the government’s bailout of the banks and endorse the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (Evans 2011: 2; FG to hold public meetings on Lisbon Treaty, *Irish Times*, 24 March 2008; Lenihan must demonstrate independence from advisers and accept Nama, *Irish Times* 19 September 2009; *Irish Times* op. cit. 26 September 2009). The continuity of political leaders’ priorities for business interests over traditional peace norms is also seen ‘externally’ as Wolfgang Schäuble
pushed Ireland and the other neutrals to drop neutrality and join the WEU “to make a gradual transition into EU security structures” (Neutrals must join NATO - Kohl aide, Irish Times 10 March 1995), and fifteen years later, as German Finance Minister, he pressured the Irish government into the November 2010 programme (Banking on Europe: the true story behind Ireland’s bailout, Irish Times 23 April 2011). Given his involvement in the 1990s, in reversing Irish peace norms, and in the 2000s, the unethical and unfair (e.g. “it is wrong to indenture citizens to bail out risk-taking investors” Presidential Poetry, Financial Times (Editorial) 3 May 2013) so-called “bail-out” programme, under which, Ireland has experienced (1) increased unemployment, (2) double the rate of emigration (Emigration rate jumps by nearly half, Irish Times 16 September 2011) and (3) the highest suicide rate in the history of the state (Suicide rate at all-time high says Minister, Irish Times 8 April 2011) and Irish people have been forced to pay the debts of unsecured bondholders (Bank Bondholders to Be Paid While Irish Public Howls, New York Times 23 January 2012), it is important to ask, mindful of the paper’s working hypothesis, whether Schäuble engaged in similar unethical, abusive behaviours as Ahern and his predecessors to Lemass?

The “CDU-Spendenaffäre” revealed a system of regular payments from businesses to Schäuble’s CDU party, (its purpose: the “cultivation of the political landscape” to render it conducive to business interests) overseen by Helmut Kohl during the twenty-five years of his party chairmanship and sixteen years as Chancellor. (Scandal Sinks Schauble, Newsweek 27 February 2000) The undeclared money - donated through procurement agencies and civic associations established to act as middle men, laundered, and held in secret accounts in order to circumvent German party financing law - was worth DM 17 million in 2000. On 14 February 2000, the Bundestag President Wolfgang Thierse sought the return of DM 41 million (approximately € 21.1 million) in state party funding from the CDU, a decision subsequently upheld by the Federal Constitutional Court. Wolfgang Schäuble, Kohl’s chosen successor as party chairman, was his accomplice in these affairs (CDU-Spendenaffäre: “Schäuble war Mittäter”, Spiegel OnLine 11 January 2000); months after the scandal broke, Schäuble first lied about, but eventually admitted that he had personally accepted a secret DM 100'000 cash donation from weapons dealer businessman and arms lobbyist Karlheinz Schreiber in 1994. On 16 February 2000, under pressure, Wolfgang Schäuble resigned from his posts of CDU chairman and leader of the parliamentary group in the Bundestag and was replaced by Angela Merkel, the then general secretary of the party. The fact that Schäuble and his party received secret donations from arms dealers would predict a corrupt policy position to pressure neutrals into NATO membership, given that membership would require them to increase defence spending.

Values

In terms of ethos, the Irish Aid programme, one of the few remaining policies of traditional Irish peace strategy, may start to change in the future. Given the new role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in development aid at the EU level, Dóchas, the Irish umbrella NGO organisation, has urged the Irish parliament’s Joint Committee on European Affairs – and especially the Sub-Committee on EU Scrutiny – to play a key role in assuring that Irish development goals are reflected as well as possible in EU development policy and practice (2008: 4). It specifically raised the spectre of “humanitarian programming being ‘informed by’ or coherent with foreign policy (in possible contradiction with humanitarian principles)” (Dóchas 2008: 11). Aid agencies criticised Irish
Aid’s draft emergency relief policy, which promised to provide greater support for military activities: they urged the review of Irish Aid in 2012 to consider, in the global context, dangers inherent in “the increased use of aid for political, military or security objectives, thereby undermining core humanitarian principles” (Dóchas 2012: 3, 4). In the wake of these fears, NGOs are seeking to remind the Irish Government that the revised White Paper on Aid should affirm Irish Aid’s express commitment to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence and should position Ireland as a driver of principled aid. (Dóchas 2012: 4)

Conclusions

This article has examined the ethos and elements of Ireland’s peace policy norms through leaders’ discourses and practices over several centuries. In the 1700s and 1800s, peace within and outside Ireland was seen as dependent on Irish independence. Tone and O’Connell’s Irish peace policy norms were (1) accorded through the values and policies of self-determination, anti-imperialism, third world solidarity (e.g. anti-African slavery, anti-Black racism in the US), the rejection of famine (war-induced and political) and slavery, and finally, anti-war attitudes; (2) reliant on international engagement and diaspora; (3) served the need for justice, rights, resistance, non-retaliation, religious tolerance and emancipation of the subjugated; (4) based on a patriotism that was almost exclusively Irish, themed with non-belligerency and non-aggression, and (5) linked to just war and neutrality in seeking to avoid being dragged into the wars of Britain and other Great Powers.

De Valera repeated these central norms of Ireland’s peace policy articulated by Tone, O’Connell and Pearse: Ireland’s contribution to world peace is based on the state’s self-determination and independence; the corollary is peace with neighbours and the world. Gaining independence (1) permitted the inclusion of norms at the level of the individual, such as a rejection of conscription; (2) provoked an intensification of the norms of self-determination, independence, anti-imperialism, multi-level international engagement (including with diaspora); (3) added the opportunity to pursue (a) normative-based global institutional cooperative engagement (conditional on purpose and effectiveness); (b) a constitutional commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes; (c) armed neutrality; (d) policies of UN peacekeeping, (e) decolonisation, and (f) disarmament; (g) anti-Big Power politics, (h) non-membership of military alliances; (i) an untied development aid policy underpinned by third world solidarity and NGO/missionary links; and finally, (4) facilitated a normative, globally-focused Irish patriotism, specifying that a good Irish patriot is a good member of the global community and an apostle for the rule of law in international affairs. Thus, Ireland’s history of oppression is infused with her peace policy ethos and norms, and her national role conception’s contribution to the world.

In terms of integrity, pre-independence leaders cite corruption leading to bias away from the national interest based on the common good, as a major barrier to peace. Tone resists the effect of elite corruption; O’Connell rejects the notion that dastardly conduct leads to success; and Pearse condemns those being ‘bought off’ by colonial masters. Although lack of official power differentiates these men from later post-independence leaders, individual behaviour and trait comparisons are still possible. For example, O’Connell’s denouncement of African slavery in the USA knowing it would impact negatively on his campaign financing indicates a willingness to take tough, ethical decisions no matter what their cost, highlighting the contrast between the dishonesty and unethical behaviour of leaders from Lemass to Ahern with past generations of Irish leaders. This article has shown that
corruption, including “entirely inappropriate …abuse of political power and Government”, is associated with a failure to uphold Irish peace norms. Thus, the suppositions of Tone, O’Connell and Pearse are corroborated and the failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates the potential to revise aspects of elite socialization theories in order to understand – and potentially predict – changes in established peace policy norms. These findings furthermore suggest that present or future changes to normative peace policies of small states that have avoided EU membership to date, such as Switzerland, should be assessed accordingly.

Elites associated with corruption or political patronage undertook the following revisions, reductions and reversals of Irish peace policy norms in the 1990s - 2000s: (1) neutrality was at first diluted by relationships with military alliances and subsequently eradicated in favour of ‘solidarity’ and mutual defence obligations in an EU collective defence; (2) Ireland’s global justice ethos was traded (somewhat literally), for a regional, interests-based European institutional cooperative engagement that is, arguably, not conditional on purpose and effectiveness; (3) the tradition of Irish Defence Forces’ UN ‘Peacekeeping’ missions is subjugated to NATO and EU-led ‘crisis management’ and ‘peace support’ missions with higher military intensity, (4) [in] support of Big Power politics rather than solidarity with the developing world and adherence to humanitarian principles, and (5) based within a discourse framework of new, unidentified, security threats. Ireland’s Aid policy, a constitutive element of peace policy, has remained true to Irish normative principles into the 2000s and is still linked to her history of famine, war and colonisation. Whether that impulse can withstand the pressures induced by the aforementioned changes in Irish foreign policy, and the potential impact of corruption and patronage of future political elites, remains to be seen.

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